The First Circuit of the Appellate Court vacated a lower court’s decision and argued that political affiliation cannot be required for some trust appointments
Separating itself from the broad dismissal powers that the U.S. Supreme Court granted the Executive Branch in Trump v. Slaughter, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s decision that stated that because trust appointments are of free appointment and free removal any criteria, including political affiliation is acceptable when considering or dismissing a candidate.
The First Circuit, on the contrary, argued that there are two types of political appointments. THe first group is those that hold a supervisory or policymaking policy making position, for which political affiliation can be required, and the second group is those who hold a position with more technical tasks. In the case of the latter, political affiliation cannot be used to dismiss or not re-appoint someone, argued the First Circuit in a decision written by Judge Gustavo Gelpí.
“The First Amendment protects public employees from adverse action due to their political affiliation, unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position,” reads the decision alluding to the judicial precedent Méndez Apponte v. Bonilla.
After decades of the New Progressive Party (NPP), controlling the mayoralty of the Maricao municipality, in 2020 the incumbent lost the race to Wilfredo Ruiz Feliciano from the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). When Ruiz Feliciano took office he decided to not reappoint Oddette López Caraballo to the position of Municipal Internal Auditor, a role she had held since 1994.
López Caraballo was reappointed after each mayoral election and she’s a member of the NPP. Ruiz Feliciano told her that since the Municipal Internal Auditor is a trust position, he wanted to hire someone from the PDP.
The District Court sided with Maricao’s mayor under the argument that because trust positions are of “free selection and free removal” there can’t be constraints to it. The lower court made the distinction between dismissing and not appointing, and argued that it can’t consider political discrimination if the person was merely not re-appointed.
On the second argument, the First Circuit argued that distinguishing between “discharged” or “failing to receive a new appointment” is a distinction without a difference that is contrary to judicial precedent.
“After all, any other result would seriously undermine the constitutional protections against political discrimination in public employment ‘because local governments could pass laws providing that the jobs of nonpolicymaking employees extend only from election to election, and that the new officeholder is entitled to make all new appointments,’” reads the decision.
As for the nature of trust appointments, the First Circuit recognized the definition of trust appointment as those “based on political or personal confidence,” which it’s different to career position that is filled through “merit-based civil service processes.”
Despite this definition, the appellate court argued that not all trust appointments can require political affiliation and stated, “whether an individual’s political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a particular public office is not resolved by merely looking at the position’s legislative classification. The First Circuit argued that there are several criteria that need to be considered including whether the person supervises personnel or has power over programs or policies, among other factors.
In Gelpí’s decision the court reaffirms previous judicial precedent that defines the role of the municipal internal auditor as one that is more technical than policymaking. Therefore, the political appointment cannot be the defining factor when appointing or dismissing a candidate.
This decision may not be the end of the road as rather than resolve the case, the First Circuit remanded it to the District Court for further proceedings, but the lower court must use these guidelines when assessing the merits of the case.
